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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
B. W. McMAHON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 7673 
MELISSA TANNER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
The parties are referred to herein as in the court below-
B. W. McMahon as Plaintiff and Melissa Tanner as Defendant. 
This is an appeal by the defendant from the decision of Judge 
F. W. Keller of the District Court of Carbon County. The 
matter was tried without a jury. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and defendant are brother and sister .. They in-
herited from their brother, John P. Mc11ahon, deceased, 550 
acres of land in Carbon County 'vhich was sold by the plaintiff 
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as administrator of said estate and with the approval of the 
defendant to Kaiser-Frazer Parts Corporation for $25.00 per 
acre. The written contract covering sale was signed on Novem-
ber 11th, 1948, and provided among other things that the 
said corporation would resell, at $25.00 per acre, two tracts 
of four acres each-one to the plaintiff and the other to the 
defendant. One of said tracts ad joined the east boundary of 
Earl Stevenson's Service Station on the Price-Dragerton High-
way and the·other adjoining the west boundary of said station, 
said tracts being designated as the East Tract and the West 
Tract, respectively. Nothing was mentioned in said agree-
ment as to which party should have the East Tract and which 
the West Tract. 
On or about the middle of November, 1949, one year after 
said agreement was entered into, Kaiser-Frazer Parts Corpora-
tion, through their attorney Edward W. Clyde, conveyed by 
special warranty deed to the plaintiff the West Tract, and to 
the defendant the East Tract. Mr. Clyde testified at the time 
when the said agreement was entered into he had urged the 
parties to designate to him which tract each was to receive, 
but they failed to do so. Consequently, he arbitrarily assigned 
the tracts to them as provided in their respective deeds. The 
plaintiff received his deed to the West tract from Mr. Clyde, 
examined it, and paid the purchase price therefor on or about 
the 15th day of November, 1949, without asking which tract he 
was purchasing. About two "'eeks later the defendant received 
her deed for the East Tract and paid the purchase price there-
for after being told by Mr. Clyde in answer to her inquiry that 
her deed covered the East Tract. 
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About the 15th day of April, 1950, the plaintiff, "'ho 
testified that he thought his deed covered the East Tract, sold 
said East Tract, \vhich was O\Yned by the defendant, to one 
Iv1ario Marchino et al for $1100.00. The purchasers, without 
receiving an abstract of title to the property or making inquiry 
at the County Recorder's Office as to the O\vner of said prop-
erty, proceeded to construct an outdoor theatre on the defend-
ant's land. Defendant had no knowledge of said sale or con-
struction until the 29th day of May, 1950, when she went to 
Carbon County from her home in Salt Lake City for Decoration 
Day .. A.t that time she saw the construction on her property 
and v1as informed by the wife of the plaintiff that the theatre 
being built thereon would open in two or three days. 
In his pleadings, plaintiff alleged that a mistake had been 
made by the grantor when the deeds were prepared and that 
he should have received the East Tract. He also alleged that 
an oral agreement was entered into between him and the de-
fendant wherein it was decided that he should receive the East 
Tract and the defendant the West Tract. The defendant denied 
that a mistake had been made or that any agreement had ever 
been entered into between the plaintiff and defendant relating 
to said tracts. After the trial, the court rendered a verdict in 
favor of the plaintiff on the ground that there was an agree-
ment, and ordered defendant to deliver to the plaintiff a deed 
to the East Tract in exchange for one from him for the West 
Tract. 
ASSIGN~1ENTS OF ERROR 
The defendant makes the following Assignments of Error: 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1. Plaintiff is entitled to no relief in equity because the 
errors he complains of were due entirely to his own inexcusible 
carelessness and negligence and could have been avoided 
through the exercise of ordinary care by him. 
2. If a mistake was made, it was not a mutual mistake 
and is, therefore, not subject to reformation. 
3. There was insufficient evidence of any agreement be-
tween the parties relating to the matter in dispute to justify 
a reformation of the deeds in question. 
ARGUMENT 
1. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO NO RELIEF IN 
EQUITY BECAUSE THE ERRORS HE COMPLAINS OF 
WERE DUE ENTIRELY TO HIS OWN INEXCUSIBLE 
CARLESSNESS AND NEGLIGENCE, AND COULD HAVE 
BEEN A VOIDED THROUGH THE EXERCISE OF ORDI-
NARY CARE BY HIM. 
The two deeds in question are clear, concise and legal so 
that the plaintiff has no remedy in a court of law. He is asking 
for a reformation of the two deeds, in an action in equity, on the 
grounds that a mistake was made and that the intentions of 
the parties were not carried out in said deeds. 
In the case of Haggerty vs. McCanna, 25 N. J. Eq. 
48, the court clearly expressed a fundamental doctrine 
followed universally by court of Equity as follows: 
rrAn error which is the result of inexcusible negligence 
is not a nzistake from the conjequence of which equity 
will grant relief.n 
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This same principle is stated as follows by the Supren1e 
Court of Oregon in the case of Wolfgang v. Henry Thiele 
Catering Co., 275 P. 33: 
nLack of the diligence of a prudent person precludes 
the granting of relief." 
This rule is stated more fully in 1 Story Eq. Jur. Paragraph 
146, as quoted in 9 L. R .. A .. (n.s.) 1211. 
nit is not, however, sufficient in all cas~s to give the 
party relief that the fact is material, but it must be such 
as he could not by reasonable diligence get know ledge 
of when he was put upon inquiry; for if by such rea-
sonable diligence, he could have obtained knowledge 
of the fact, equity will not relieve him, since that would 
en~ourage culpable negligence." · 
* * * 
c]t is not, however, in every case of mistake even 
of a material fact, that the court will grant relief, 
for, if the mistake is the result of the party's careless-
ness or inattention the court will not interfere -in 
his behalf, its policy being to adtninister relief to the 
vigilant, and to put all parties upon the exercise of a 
reasonable degree of diligence." Toops v. Snyder, 70 
Ind., 560 as quoted in 9 L. R .... A. ( n.s.) 1211. 
In order, therefore, for the plaintiff to be entitled to a 
reformation of the deeds in question, it n1ust be made clear 
that he exercised at least ordinary care and reasonable dili-
gence relating to the transaction. As to this the facts are 
undisputed. 
On the 11th day of November, 1948, when the written 
contract between Kaiser-Frazer Parts Corporation and the plain-
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tiff, as administrator of his brother's estate was executed, Mr. 
Clyde, attorney for the corporation, testified that he repeatedly 
urged the plaintiff and his sister to decide between themselves 
as to which of them should receive the East Tract and which 
the West Tract so that he. could put it in the contract and 
know how to make out the deeds, but they failed to do so. 
"Nobody instructed me," Mr. Clyde testified, ~~what 
grantee to put in the deeds and I arbitrarily put her 
(defendant) name on one and him (plaintiff) on the 
other." (Tr. P. 55). 
If an agreement had actually been entered into between 
the parties on that point, the plaintiff was negligent in not so 
informing Mr. Clyde so as to guard against an error, for he 
was a party to the contract with the corporation. When he 
failed to do so, it became especially incumbent upon him to be 
on the alert for a mistake when the deeds were executed and 
delivered. The exercise of ordinary diligence would certainly 
have required that he at least make inquiry of Mr. Clyde at 
the time he received his deed and paid for the property con-
veyed by it as to which tract had been conveyed to him. This 
he did not do. On this point Mr. Clyde testified as follows; 
Tr. P. 56-57. 
Q. uDid you deliver the deed to Mr. McMahon? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Will you state what occurred at that time? 
A. It might help if I prefaced it this way, Mr. Maw. 
I sent a letter to each of them telling them the deeds 
were ready and in response to the letters, each of them 
came to my office. He (plaintiff) came in, oh, at least 
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a \veek or ten days before she did. I gaz'e bint biJ deed. 
He loo,~ed it ot'er, be did;z't as,~ dllJ questions about it 
at all. He paid me the money. and n1y recollection is that 
I gave him a receipt and he ·teft, and that is all there 
\Yas to it." 
A mere inquiry at that time directed to Mr. Clyde by the 
plaintiff as to \V hich tract had been conveyed to him, if he did 
not so discover it when nhe looked it over" before he paid 
for it, would have been all that \vas necessary to detern1ine 
the true status of the transaction. Any prudent purchaser 
would have done that. The fact that he did not do so either 
raises a presumption that he knew he was purchasing the West 
Tract or proves that he was very careless and negligent. 
When the defendant received her deed from Mr. Clyde, 
she inquired of him as to which tract she was purchasing, ·and 
was informed by him that it was the East Tract, before she paid 
for the land and accepted the deed. 
The plaintiff's subsequent transactions relating to the 
property continued to be careless and negligent. He sold the 
East Tract, which he did not ov1n, without having a.n abstract 
of title made or without checking with the county r~corder as 
to the validity of his title to that tract. The purchaser accepted 
his deed and placed constructions on the property without 
checking the title. Every step in the whole procedure relating 
to the property taken by the plaintiff was froth with careless-
ness, neglect and wanton indifference. His carelessness and 
negligence were directly responsible for all of the errors com-
plained of, and each one of thern could have been ascertained 
and avoided through the exercise of ordinary care and dili-
gence by him. 
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That the court should not aid him under such circum-
stances is supported by numerous authorities, a few samples 
of which are listed below. 
''Equity assists only the vigilant. It does not relieve 
against mistakes which ordinary care would have pre-
vented. Conscience, good faith, and reasonable dili-
gence are necessary to call a court of equity into ac-
tivity." Wirsching v. Grand Lodge etc., 56 At. 713. 
* * * 
HThe conclusion is that he (the Complainant) is not 
entitled to relief where the evidence shows that he was 
'negligent' or that he could and would have ascertained 
the facts by the exercise of 'due' or 'reasonable' dili-
gence, or where he had 'means of knowledge' or 'might 
have ascertained the truth.' In other words, mistake, 
to constitute equitable relief, must not be merely the 
result of inattention, personal negligence, or miscon-
duct on the part of the party applying for relief." 19 
Am. Juris., 77 Par. 57. 
* * * 
"A person who is possessed of his normal mental 
faculties and is able to read and write, and having the 
. opportunity to read the contract, but neglects and fails 
to do so, cannot escape the legal effect of the written 
agreement because the terms expressed therein may 
be different from those agreed upon, unless the party 
signing the contract is free from negligence in ascer-
taining the contents of the written contract at the time 
he attaches his signature thereto.'' Cherokee Oil and 
Gas Co., v. Lucky Leaf Oil and Gas Co. (Okla.) 242 
P. 214. 
* * * 
"It is the duty of a party to an instrument to ascer-
tain its true meaning and purport and to understand its 
contents before afixing his signature; and if he fails 
10 
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to discharge his duty, he is guilty of negligence which 
ordinarily '"ill deprive hin1 of relief by way of refor-
mation on the grounds of mistake. .At least he is pre-
sumptively guilty of gross negligence and the burden 
of proof rests on him to rebut the presumption.'' 45 
Am. Jur. 632, Par. 79. 
* * * 
In Hayes v. Travelers Inc. Co., 93 F. (2d) 568, it 
was stated that one having the capacity and opportunity 
to read an instrument, who executes it without reading 
it ,or ascertaining its meaning, in the absence of fraud 
or imposition or special circun1stances excusing his 
failure to read it, is charged with knowledge of its 
contents and cannot avoid the contract by asserting 
that it did not express what he intended.'' 
* * * 
tcEquity aids the vigilant, and will not extend its 
aid, by reforming an instrument, to one who has been 
guilty of culpable negligence especially when the change 
might injuriously affect the rights or status of the other 
party to the instrument or of an innocent third person. 
Equity requires that the party who asks for relief on 
the grounds 9! tnutual mistake shall have exercised at 
least the degree of diligence U'hich may be fairly ex-
pected f1"om a reasonable person. Cases are, therefore, 
not infrequent where relief against" mistake, by reforma-
tion, has been·. refused on the grounds that the party 
complaining had within his reach the means of ascer-
taining the true state of facts and without being induced 
thereto by the other party, neglected to avail himself 
of his opportunities for information." 45 Am. Juris., 
631 Par. 78. 
2. IF A MISTAKE WAS ACTUALLY ~1ADE, IT WAS 
NOT A 1v1UTUAL ONE AND IS, THEREFORE, NOT SUB-
JECT TO REFORMATION. 
11 
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It is a general rule that courts will not reform a written 
agreement or instrument on the grounds of mistake unless the 
mistake is a mutual one involving all of the parties. In cases 
where only one of the parties was mistaken, the action should 
be for recission because there was no meeting of the minds, 
not for reformation. A clear statement of this rule is found 
in 9 Am. Juris. 378, Par. 33. 
"Moreover it is to be noticed that a deed may be 
reformed or corrected in equity upon the ground of 
mistake only when the mistake is mutual; if the mistake 
is unilateral, the remedy is recission.'' 
In the instant case, three parties are involved in the exe~ 
cution of the deeds which t~e plaintiff seeks to reform. They 
are Kaiser-Frazer Parts Corporation, grantor in both deeds, 
Plaintiff, grantee in the deed conveying the West Tract, and 
defendant, grantee in the deed conveying the East Tract. The 
testimony is· undisputed that Mr. Clyde, representing the 
grantor, made no mistake when he prepared and delivered the 
deeds in question. He decided which tract was to he sold to 
each of the parties. He intended that the defendant should 
receive the East Tract for he so advised her before receiving 
the consideration for the sale. He also knew that the plaintiff 
had purchased the West Tract. The defendant knew she was 
purchasing the East Tract when she accepted delivery of the 
deed. Plaintiff was the only party :who was mistaken, if any 
'mistake was actually made by anyone, and his mistake was 
due entirely to his own carelessness. There is no conflict in 
the testimony on this point. The only remedy of the plaintiff, 
therefore, is for a recission of his deed from the grantor if 
12 
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he so desires, and not for a reformation of the two instruments. 
Authorities on this point are numerous. 
((It is stated as a general rule that in order to jus-
tify the granting of relief on the ground of mistake, 
the parties to the transaction must have been mutually 
tnistaken, a mistake on the part of one party not being 
relievable." 19 Am. Juris. 77 Par. 57. 
* * * 
HI£ the mistake goes to the identity of the property 
itself (as. in the instant case) the instrument may be 
rescinded, but not reformed, since there was no meeting 
of the minds of the parties." 16 Am. Juris. 465 Par. 
4~6; Page v. Higgins (Mass.) 22 N. E. 63; 5 L.R.A. 
152. 
* * * 
((Where no question of fraud, bad faith, or inequit-
able conduct is involved and the right to reform an in-
strument is based solely on a mistake, it is necessary 
that the mistake be nzutual and that both parties under-
stood the contract as the com plaint or petition alleges 
it ought to have been, and as in fact it was except for 
the mistake, and this is so whether the mistake is one 
of fact or one of law or one of fact and law mixed. 
Otherwise stated, a unilateral mistake is not ordinarily 
ground for reformation, the remedy in the case thereof 
being recission." 45 Am. Juris., 617 Pa~. 55. 
* * * 
"Equitable relief from a mutual mistake is frequently 
given by a reformation of the contract. But a contract 
will not be reformed for a unilateral mistake." 59 
A.L.R. 809. 
* * * 
((As respects the reformation of instruments, the 
general rule, subject to various and varying exceptions, 
13 
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is that equity will reform instruments for the correction 
of errors when they do not conform to the intentions 
of the parties, by mistake, that is to say by mutual mis-
take, or mistake of one party and fraud or inequitable 
conduct of the other. . .. and the mistake must have 
been in the drafting of the instrument not in the making 
of the contract. An instrument will not be reformed 
on the ground of a mere misunderstanding of facts or 
a mistake as to an extrinsic fact which, if known, 
would probably have induced the making of a different 
contract. If there has been any misunderstanding be-
tween the parties, or a misapprehension by one or both 
so their minds have not met no contract has been 
entered into, and the court will not make for them a 
contract which they did not make." 45 Am. Juris. 
609-10, Par. 46. 
* * * 
3. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF ANY 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN RELATION 
TO THE TRANSACTION TO JUSTIFY A REFOR~1ATION 
OF THE DEEDS. 
The court below ignored the other issues discussed herein 
and based its decision on this one. 
A deed is a solemn instrument. It is clothed with for-
malities in its execution and courts have always been reluctant 
to reform them except under the n1ost extenuating circum-
stances, because they represent the ownership of land which is 
a sacred right of all free peoples. Consequently, the courts 
have universally required that evidence justifying a reform of 
deeds be very strong, definite and certain. This rule is stated 
clearly by the Supreme Court of Washington_ in the case of 
14 
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Puget Mill Co. vs. Kerry, 49 P (2d) 57, quoting from 2 
Pomeroy, Equity Juris. (4th Ed.) Par. 859. 
ttThe auth~rities all require that the parol evidence 
of the mistake and of the alleged n1odification must be 
clear and convincing-in the language of some judges, 
cthe strongest possible'-or else the mistake must be 
admitted by the opposite party. The resulting proof 
must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Courts 
of equity do not grant the high remedy of reformation 
upon a probability, nor even upon a mere preponderance 
of evidence, but only upon a certainty of error." 
Has the plaintiff presented evidence in support of his 
contention that he and his sister made an agreement between 
themselves on the matter at issue which is conclusive, is the 
real question before the court. 
There seems to be no doubt but what both parties prefer-
red the West Tract on November 11th, 1948, when the plain-
tiff testified the alleged oral agreement "\vas supposed to have 
been made. Both parties agree that they discussed the matter 
in Mr. Clyde's office. Mr. Clyde testified that he asked thetn to 
decide the matter between themselves. Defendant testified as 
follows on this point, Tr. p. 19: 
Q. tc ••• Which tract of land did you say you wanted? 
A. I told him (Plaintiff) my choice would be on the 
west side. 
Q. The west side. And hoping that you would get it, 
you planted trees and shrubs on the west tract, is that 
correct? 
A. Well, I thought that, yes. 
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Q. And when you expressed that desire to your 
brother that you wanted the west tract, what did your 
brother say ? 
A. He said, (That is the piece I wanted.' That is 
what he \\ranted. 
Q. He wanted it for himself? 
A. That is right. 
Q. Did he give you any reason vvhy he wanted it? 
A. No, I don't know. 
Q. Did he say anything about going into business 
with anyone ? 
A. Oh, yes, he did. 
Q. What did he say? 
A. He said Mr. Stevenson, the garage man, and he 
were going into some kind of car business. I don't 
know, second hand cars. Some kind of car business." 
On this point the plaintiff's testimony was in agreement 
with that of the defendant. He testified as follows after the 
defendant had expressed/ her preference for the West Tract 
to him. 
ttl said to her, (Well you chose the side, you chose the 
side I wanted.' I did want the \\rest side. I wanted the 
west side, a Mr. Stevenson vvas talking about putting 
up a service station, not a service station but a dance 
hall." Tr. 61-62. 
It was this conversation that the plaintiff contends was an 
agreement that he should have the East Tract and his sister 
the West one. It. should be noted that at no time did the 
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plaintiff or any other \vitness testify that plaintiff agreed that 
defendant should have the West Tract or that he accepted 
her offer to take the West Tract. 
!he above conversation took place in Mr. C~yde's office 
as he was urging the parties to get together on who should get 
the two tracts, yet Plaintiff testified definitely that he did not 
inform Mr. Clyde of their alleged agreement. It is incon-
ceivable that a prudent man exercising ordinary diligence would 
have failed to convey the information as to the agreement to 
the one who was urging them to get together so that he might 
make out the deeds properly if an agreement had been actually 
entered into. This _failure to inform Mr. Clyde plus the fact 
that the plaintiff at no time testified that he consented to or 
acquiesced in the defendant's request that she have the West 
Tract is strong evidence that there was no meeting of the 
minds of the party on that issue. In view of the fact that 
no other discussions of the matter were ever held between the 
parties after that, it seems clear that the preponderance of the 
evidence supports the defendant's declaration tha:t she and her 
brother never decided between themselves as to which of thein 
should get either the East or the West Tract. 1 1he so-called 
agreement amounted to no more than a declaration of conflict-
ing preferences, both wanting the same tract of land, with 
no evidence that they ever settled their differences. 
Plaintiff was the administrator of his deceased brother's 
estate and was a resident of Carbon County. He was well ac-
quainted with the relative values of the two tracts of land. In 
fact he testified as to the relative value of the two (Tr. P. 59) 
and from his testimony it is apparent that he felt that the 
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. West Tract was much the more valuable. It is natural that he 
preferred that tract. 
The evidence seems to indicate that the defendant felt 
that her brother would eventually give her the piece she chose. 
Sisters usually think that their brothers· will eventually give 
in to their wishes. With that in mind she planted two or three 
trees on the West Tract. It was not until she was in Mr. Clyde's 
office to get her deed that she realized that her brother had 
taken the tract she had wanted for himself. She became upset 
and said that the plaintiff had ccjust tricked me again." Mr. 
Clyde testified that she said, ((Well, Ben (Plaintiff) and I 
agreed that he get this piece and I would get the other one," 
but it seems clear from all of the circumstances that her use 
of the term ((agreed" in her conversation with Mr. Clyde was 
loosely used and was more of an expression of her desires, 
and of what she felt her brother would eventually do in that 
matter, than a declaration that a contract had been entered 
into between them. Defendant definitely denies any con-
tractual agreemen~ with her brother on that point. Her husband, 
who was with her during her discussions with Mr. Clyde, 
testified that the statement made by his wife to Mr. Clyde when 
she was informed that she was to get the East Tract was, ((I 
thought I wa~s going to get the West parcel." His remem-
brance of the conversation was quite different from that of 
Mr. Clyde on that issue. But regardless of what was said on that 
occasion, the fact still remains that there was no testimony to 
the effect that the offer of the defendant to take the West Tract 
was ever accepted by the plaintiff. Without an o!Jet· and ac-
ceptance there is no binding contract. 
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It is the contention of the defendant that plaintiff presented 
no substantial proof of an agreement bet\veen the parties, on 
the point at issue. The conversations between them on the 
subject amounted to no more than expressions of preference. 
But even if Plaintiff's evidence indicates to the court a prob-
ability of a binding agreement, surely it cannot be contended 
that the evidence was strong enough to have removed reason-
able doubt on the subject, for as quoted above, ccCourts of 
equity do not grant the high remedy of reformation upon a 
probability, nor even upon a mere preponderance of evidence, 
but only upon a certainty of error." 
A few of the numerous decisions of courts on this point 
are referred to below: 
Hit is well settled that courts of equity will enforce 
parol agreements respecting the sale of lands in cases 
of mistake or fraud, and in furtherance of this end 
will reform deeds and other written instruments. But it 
is equally well settled that a court will administer 
this high equitable remedy only on a clear case. Before 
a court of equity will declare such a parol ttgreenzent 
creates an obligation and confers a remedial right not 
within the Statutes of Frauds} it will require co gent 
proof. The decisions which support this proposition 
are numerous. Not only must the mistake or fraud 
be so proven; the precise terms of the oral agreement 
claimed must be made equally clear." Holman v. Vieira, 
300 P. 946 (Nev.) 
* * * 
In Blue v. Blue, 116 S. E. 134 (W.Va.) 30 A. L. R. 
1169, the court said: nThe principles of law applicable 
to reformation of a deed because of mistake are well 
settled and defined in our decisions. Where the mistake 
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is clearly made out by proof, equity will reform the 
deed so as to make it exactly conform to the intent of 
the parties. But if the proof is doubtful, and the mis-
take is not made plain beyond reasonable controt'ersy, 
the deed will not be reformed. A deed is a solemn 
instrument executed with formality and imports full 
and complete exposure of the intent of the parties, 
requiring convincing and absolute proof of mistake 
before it can be reformed or Jet ctSide. The Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin has gone so far as to hold that it 
would be an extreme case where it would reform a 
written instrument upon the uncorroborated testimony 
of a party thereto, even if such testimony was uncon-
tradicted. The books are full of cases which illustrate 
the extreme caution which courts exercise in such mat-
ters. Relief u'ill be denied whenever the evidence is 
loose, equivocal, or cont1'adictory, or is open to doubt 
or opposing presumptions." 
* * * 
c CW e must bear in mind the well established rule 
that, in order to justify ref ortnation of a contract, the 
evidence must be full, unequivocal, and convincing as to 
the mistake and its rnutuality. A preponderance of evi-
dence is not enough. The proof must establish the facts 
to a moral certainty and take the case out of the range 
of reasonable controversy.'' Home Insurance Co. vs. 
Akers (Okla.) 221 Pac. 493. 
* * * 
ccThere is a direct conflict in the oral evidence upon 
the issue as to an agreement respecting the sale of the 
personal property subject to the lien for existing taxes. 
Where any doubt exists as to the intent of the parties, 
reformation U'ill not be granted." John Hancock etc. 
v. Agnew (Wash.), 95 P. 2d 386. 
* * * 
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Hit is a rule so well settled as to need no citation of 
sustaining authority, that a written instrument, which 
constitutes the contract between two parties, will be 
reformed only U'hen fraud or rnistake is shou'n by 
clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. If as in the case 
at bar the evidence is in sharp conflict or any doubt 
exists as to the intent of the parties, reformation will 
not be granted. Carew et al v. General Casualty Co., 
65 P. 2d 689. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the negligence of the plaintiff is entirely respon-
sible for the errors from which he now seeks relief, and because 
the alleged mistake was not a tnutual one and is, therefore, 
not subject to reformation; and because the evidence of an 
oral agreement relied upon by the Plaintiff to reform the deeds 
in question was not full, clear, unequivocal and convincing, 
defendant prays that the judgment of the lower court be set 
aside, and that she have judgment with costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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